What FMSF said they did:
The Foundation is very much concerned that those found guilty of abuse are appropriately punished and that every effort be made to stem child abuse. - Pamela Freyd, in the FMSF Newsletter. 
What FMSF actually did:
✓ + Misconstrued cases and defended perpetrators who admitted guilt, or those whose victims had clear corroborating evidence.
Dennis Hood: “Ambiguous” with “Good Intentions.”
Julie Herald sued her uncle, Dennis Hood, alleging sexual abuse from age 3 (in 1962) through 15. Herald recovered her memories of childhood abuse as an adult, while watching her 4-year-old daughter play with a friend. 
Herald had multiple forms of corroboration for her memories. Hood acknowledged that he abused Herald a confession in a taped telephone conversation, saying that she “had been the only one.”  Two therapists testified that at a meeting with Herald in their offices, he admitted sexually abusing her. [4, 5] The Summit County court in Ohio found him guilty, and the supreme court in Ohio upheld the decision. 
The FMSF used this case as “valuable guidelines for those involved in defending themselves against such allegations” and “a stern warning of the pitfalls that can befall anyone involved in this type of litigation.” They advise that Hood’s “admissions of abuse in front of witnesses… damaged his defense and provided substantial evidence which was used against him.” It is implied that readers facing similar litigations should be careful to not act similarly - to never admit their abuse in front of witnesses. 
Hood’s admissions of abuse concerned his confession on the taped phone call to Julie Herald: “You are the only one… From the letter you don't believe that, but I wanted to tell you you were the only one, for whatever it's worth.”  At trial, Hood verified that he knew that Julie’s letter was about the alleged sexual abuse, and that “Julie was concerned about whether or not she was the only one that you had abused.” 
The FMSF claimed that Hood had “good intentions” and that his recorded admission of abuse was “ambiguous and could not be explained.” 
Billy Banks was convicted of rape, forced oral sex, and fondling of his daughter and adoptive niece, adults at the time of the trial. His adoptive niece had an abortion at age 13, with evidence that Banks was the father.
Banks was also charged with lewd, lascivious or indecent acts on a child under 16 for sexually abusing his two granddaughters – he pled no contest to these charges.
The FMSF left out all information pertaining to the granddaughters – abuse that occurred in 1990-1. They did not mention his adoptive niece’s relation to Banks:
“Florida jury…found 68-year-old Billy Banks Sr. guilty of sexually molesting two
girls in the 1960s.”
“The accusers, Banks' daughter and another woman…” 
The FMSF left out his niece’s abortion, construing the accounts of Banks’ adoptive niece and daughter as based solely on recovered memories:
“The only evidence in the trial were the recovered memories of two accusers ages 43 and 44.” 
This is contrary to the testimony of both women; they both had continuous memories of abuse, and stated that they had trouble forgetting it. Bank’s niece says, “every day I think about it. There’s not a day goes by that I don’t think about [it],”  and his daughter says that “I was always trying to…put it behind me.”  Similarly, there was no mention of recovered memories in his granddaughters' accusations.
The FMSF claimed that due to surprise circumstances the defense’s expert witness was unable to testify:
“The defense had planned to present an expert from Michigan to testify about the fallibility of recovered memories. However, at the last minute the expert could not come, and the Circuit Judge Larry Schack refused to delay the trial.” 
This was not the case. The ‘expert,’ Dr. Terence Campbell, “has [n]ever been certified as a ‘memory expert.’” Instead of testifying about recovered memory, he was testifying on the “effect of time on memory.” The court ruled no expert was needed on the subject. 
The FMSF also put undue emphasis on his daughter’s and niece’s illnesses.
“[One accuser is] undergoing intensive drug addiction counseling. The second accuser is disabled by back problems and depression for which she takes painkillers and anti-anxiety drugs.” 
Neither of these facts relate to their ability to accurately testify, the accuracy of their memories, or the incriminating evidence against Banks.
The FMSF misrepresented this case by omitting two victims and incriminating evidence, misconstruing the case as based solely on recovered memory, implying that the court unfairly barred an expert witness for the defense on recovered memory, and including unrelated information on the womens’ counseling history, mental illness, and disabled status.
Without explicitly asserting Banks’ innocence, the FMSF’s framing of the case makes it easy for readers to conclude that Billy Banks’s case was a false conviction in an unfair trial without expert defense, based only on the recovered memories of mentally ill women from over 40 years ago.
After being made aware of these inaccuracies, the FMSF did not correct any of their errors. They reprinted their article on Billy Banks with no changes, simply stating that “Readers can decide for themselves if "embraced" is an accurate description [for how the FMSF covered the case]” 
Read more on this blog post.
Piper: Junk Skepticism
In a response to Ross Cheit’s article “Consider this, skeptics of recovered memory,” August Piper, an FMSF advisory board member who frequently wrote columns for their newsletter on ‘false memory’ cases, criticized an early iteration of the case's archive in his article “A Skeptic Considers, Then Responds to Cheit.” Piper acknowledged that Cheit had compiled 35 documented cases, but only analyzed 7 of them in his critique. His analysis misconstrued these cases, omitted critical information, and reported false facts. Throughout his critique, Piper relied heavily upon the FMSF legal analysis of cases by Anita Lipton
Case 1. Meiers-Post v. Schafer
Piper attempted to cast doubt on Meiers-Post’s testimony, which was based on recovered memories of abuse in a successful civil suit against a Michigan teacher. Piper’s account is clearly illegitimate, peppered with false facts, omitted information, and incorrect source material.
Without naming those involved in the trial, Piper claimed that the expert testifying in support of Meiers-Post’s repression had “never examined her.” Upon a close examination of the facts, the experts who testified in defense of Meiers-Post were Joan Brazelton, who directly treated Meiers-Post, and Dr. Andrew S Watson, who specifically described his examination of Meiers-Post during the trial.
While arguing that the sexual contact was non-traumatic and therefore unable to be repressed, Piper claimed that it was “clearly… voluntary” and that she was “hardly a child: She was 15 to 18 years old.” However, Schafer stated himself that his actions were “definitely wrong” and involved an abuse of trust, while Meiers-Post clearly testified that she never consented to the sexual contact. Piper omitted that 13 other women victimized by Schafer, while unable to testify in the trial, attested that their sexual contact was coercive and non-consensual. Regardless of whether it is traumatic or not, under Michigan law it is a crime to coerce a child under 16 into sexual contact.
In an attempt to cast doubt upon Meiers-Post’s recovered memories, Piper questioned how the memories were spurred by a television program, rather than her repeated contact with Schafer in following years. However, he omitted critical information: the television program was about sexual abuse perpetrated by a trusted teacher.
Finally, Piper stated that the “court explicitly declined to accept the argument that the plaintiff had repressed her memories,” offering quotes from the court: “further factual development is needed.” Most strikingly, Piper’s selected quotes arguing that the evidence was inconclusive were all sourced from the appellate court decision, which he cited repeatedly throughout his critique. The appellate court reviewed a motion to dismiss Meiers-Post’s complaint, which they reversed, allowing the case to go forward. The trial itself was held at a later date, where the “further factual development” occurred. Piper did not analyze the trial itself, and never mentioned that the appellate court decision preceded the trial. Piper allowed his audience to assume that the appellate decision was the final court decision in the case. Schafer was convicted in the following trial.
Case 32. Franklin v. Stevenson
In this case, the jury’s verdict to convict Stevenson based on Franklin’s corroborated recovered memories was overturned by the Judge in a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Piper stated that the archive did not discuss the Judge’s reasoning, and attempted to cast doubt on Franklin’s memories by quoting from related court documents. Piper juxtaposed three separate quotes from the record to heavily imply that Stevenson’s memories were hypnotically enhanced and thereby inadmissible. The first quote details various techniques used to recover Stevenson’s memories, including “guided imagery” “relaxation” “writing with the non-dominant hand” “trance work” “communicating with inner children” and “journaling.” The second quote criticizes testimony based on hypnotically refreshed memories, stating that they “threaten the truth-finding function of juries.” However, the issues begin with Piper’s third quote:
“Hypnotically-enhanced testimony is inherently unreliable and has, therefore, been excluded by the Utah Supreme Court [citation omitted]. All [italics added] of the Plaintiff’s testimony was enhanced through [these or similar techniques].”
The actual quote reads:
“While hypnotically-refreshed memory and hypnotically-enhanced testimony is "inherently unreliable and inadmissible as evidence" in Utah courts, (State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 at 1119), we agree with Franklin's position. There is insufficient evidence before us to conclude that the two forms of therapies are sufficiently similar to warrant a wholesale condemnation of the therapeutic techniques at issue in this case.” 
Upon searching the record, there is no mention of the final sentence of Piper’s quote. Despite Piper’s implication, the court found that Franklin’s therapy was sufficiently distinct from hypnosis. 
Finally, Piper failed to mention that the Utah Supreme Court overturned the Judge’s decision. Earlier in the trial, Stevenson motioned to exclude Franklin’s testimony based on inadmissibility, and the Judge overturned it – allowing Franklin to testify in the trial. The Court ruled that JNOV was granted in error. The Judge’s decision to permit Franklin to testify on her memories only to later rule her testimony inadmissible after the trial concluded left Franklin “unable to remedy the situation” having “relied heavily” on “later-excluded evidence” without the “opportunity to introduce new evidence.” 
Even though the Utah Supreme Court decided to overturn Stevenson’s conviction along with the Judge’s ruling, it was not due to Franklin’s testimony being hypnotically enhanced – the court ruled Franklin “failed to prove” during the trial that the methods used (relaxation, guided imagery, journaling) to recover her memories were “scientifically reliable.”  As her testimony was admitted and her therapy equated with hypnosis, she didn’t have an opportunity to meet the burden of proof that was later imposed for her therapist’s specific methods.
Despite the overturning of the conviction, the case still is in the archive. Though the categories often overlap, the archive’s goal is to collect corroborated cases of recovered memories, not cases where the perpetrator was successfully convicted. In the original jury verdict, the jury clearly stated that Franklin procured sufficient corroboration for her memories. That finding of fact is worth including in the archive. If anything, the jury confirming the existence of significant corroborative evidence despite Franklin’s testimony being ruled inadmissible makes this case even more unusual and noteworthy.
Case 27. State v. Quattrocchi
Piper uses this case as an example of insufficient corroboration, arguing that even if the court found “that the defendant had abused one [other] person” previously, that doesn’t prove the defendant abused the plaintiff. Firstly, the corroborating testimonies came from two independent accounts; the first from his goddaughter, and the second from an unrelated girl at a slumber party.
Secondly, the corroboration did not stem solely from the fact that others testified about Quattrocchi’s sexual abuse in and of itself. His goddaughter spoke about sexual harassment in the shower that was remarkably similar to an incident alleged by the plaintiff. Such similarity cannot be discounted when weighing the evidence, and that detail was left unmentioned by Piper.
Finally, Piper points out that the Rhode Island Supreme Court overturned the verdict, and claims it was due to “that court’s grave concerns about the reliability of recovered memory testimony.” He does not quote or cite the decision. On the contrary, the court discussed the need for courts to determine if expert testimony on PTSD is needed, and if recovered memory evidence is reliable. Indeed, the ruling was overturned because there was not proper expert testimony on the subject. Contrary to Piper’s claim, the court used State v. Quattrocchi as precedent to allow recovered memory testimony in State v. Desrosiers and a separate case that led to the conviction of Anthony Rubino.
Case 8. Leonard v. Estate of Cowles
In the critique of the archive, Piper protested that Cheit did not explore “alternate explanation[s] for [the] findings,” including “other simple, readily understandable explanations… for the behavior of the people” who “benefit” from alleging amnesia. Piper characterizes Leonard v. Estate of Cowles with one sentence: “the plaintiff filed at age 38 – only after his deceased uncle left $1 million to charity.” It’s clear that Piper is implying that Leonard filed false claims of abuse for financial gain after learning about his uncle’s wealth. However, Piper is wrong: Leonard confronted his uncle before his death. His uncle admitted to the abuse and killed himself before any legal proceedings could take place.
There’s more evidence that shows that financial gain was not the reason behind the lawsuit. The Cowles Estate had a long and monied history, and a claim brought earlier would’ve yielded much more money. Secondly, Leonard did not challenge all distributions of the estate, an action that would’ve brought him more money and something he clearly would have done if motivated by greed.
Finally, once again, Piper omitted corroborating evidence that supports Leonard’s allegations of abuse. During the trial, the investigation uncovered Cowles’ four previous convictions of sexual abuse, all targeting boys, just a few years before Leonard’s abuse began. Months before filing the suit and learning anything about Cowles prior record, Leonard told his therapist about a specific incident of sexual abuse that nearly exactly matched a scenario described in a previous conviction.
Case 9. Herald v. Hood
Piper described the Herald v. Hood case as an example of an archive case with bad corroboration. In the process, he omitted three examples of corroborative evidence that were key to closing the case: Hood’s tape-recorded confession years before trial that Herald “was the only one” he abused, the testimony of two therapists who witnessed Hood confessing to specific acts of abuse and apologizing to Herald, and evidence confirming the specific visit with and confession to the therapists occurred.
Instead of investigating the actual corroboration in the case, Piper claimed (without citations) that Herald stated her sister witnessed an incident of sexual abuse. Her sister testified that she did not witness any abuse – if Piper’s claim was true, this would cast doubt on Herald’s memory and the supposed statement that her sister corroborated her allegations. However, upon analysis of the original complaint and Herald’s testimony, it’s clear that Herald never once claimed her sister witnessed any abuse – rendering the sister’s testimony irrelevant to the reliability of Herald’s allegations or the existence of corroboration.
Piper subsequently claimed that Herald alleged abuse at 10 years old, when Hood was stationed overseas. However, Herald never claimed that she was abused at that time. During the trial, it was made clear that Hood had access to Herald during the time periods of all alleged abuse. Piper’s claim stems from a similar, yet unrelated part of the case: after the trial, Hood claimed that he was stationed overseas at that time of another incident, not when Herald was 10. This claim was not brought to the jury, and was unable to be cross-examined – likely because the facts indicated otherwise. Hood gave Herald a gift during this time period, when he was at home or on leave. He attempted to motion for a new-trial based on this claim, but was denied and the original verdict was upheld.
Case 15. Keene v. Edie
Piper claimed this case represents “unsatisfactory” standards for corroboration that “limps badly,” due to the unreliability of witnesses. Piper mentioned two witnesses: he stated that one later retracted her allegations of abuse, while the other passed away and was unable to be cross-examined at trial. These statements are undocumented and false. Later, he uses this case as an example of insufficient corroboration where the court found “that the defendant had abused one [other] person,” when there were at least three other people abused by Edie.
The daughter who passed away – April Edie – was cross-examined, though not at Keene’s trial. She successfully brought a case against Edie for sexual and physical abuse years before, and was cross-examined then. April testified that her father whipped her, beat her, sexually abused her, and threatened her by shooting a gun at her feet. Her testimony and the related cross-examination was unsealed for Keene’s trial.
Secondly, it is incorrect to describe Heather Edie as retracting her allegations of abuse. At trial, she testified three times in support of Keene, corroborating physical attacks and sexual abuse by Edie. Years later, under pressure from her father who wanted a retrial, it is said that Heather claimed that she was going to retract her testimony in support of her father. She never did. Upon her deposition 20 years later, she was confronted with her sworn statement to a judge at 19, asserting abuse by Edie as the reason she ran away to stay with her grandmother. Heather upheld her previous allegations of abuse; she testified that her claim to retract was because she had “blocked it out somehow” and that upon seeing the statement, “it all came back to me.” The judge deemed the so-called retraction “not credible” and denied Edie’s motion for a retrial.
Finally, there was a third witness, unmentioned by Piper: Beverly Gallagher, a friend of Edie’s daughter, was also victimized by Edie. Her testimony, based on continuous memories, graphically described abuse by Edie. The defendant chose to end her testimony without questions.
Case 28. Commonwealth v. Crawford
In this case, Piper focuses on the credibility of a witness who “claimed to repress a memory for 20 years” as another example of “unsatisfactory” corroboration. Once again, Piper omitted key corroborating evidence: the testimony of Crawford’s former wife and physical evidence matching the witness’ description of the murder.
In regards to the witness, John Reed, Piper claims that an attorney for the prosecution admitted that Reed’s claim of recovered memory after 20 years “strained credibility.” These words are Piper’s own – he provides no citation. According to the record, the attorney actually said “I submit to you that Reed is worthy of your belief.”
Secondly, Piper argues that there was no attempt during the trial to prove that the witness actually suffered from amnesia and subsequently recovered the memory. In cases concerning sexual abuse – commonly associated with recovered memories – there is a statue of limitations barring one from bringing criminal charges if a certain amount of time has passed. Recovered memories are the exception, and charges can be brought after the time has passed if one can prove in court that they truly experienced amnesia and subsequent recovery. However, there is no such statute of limitations in murder cases. Whether Reed truly suffered amnesia or simply remembered it all along was irrelevant to the court, and the court did not need to prove that his memory was recovered – just that it was credible. The defense appealed the decision, arguing that they should present expert testimony on whether or not the memory was truly forgotten and recovered, but the motion was overturned and Crawford’s conviction was upheld.
Case 13. Commonwealth v. Porter
In the Commonwealth v. Porter case, the perpetrator pleaded guilty and was unquestionably responsible for his crimes. Dozens of victims were uncovered during the investigation, multiple of whom experienced recovered memories. Despite this, Piper only mentioned one of the victims with recovered memories, Frank Fitzpatrick, and neglected to mention any of the corroborating evidence. He stated that Fitzpatrick “apparently acknowledged, in a 1993 speech, “that he ‘didn’t really forget’ his rape,” but pushed it out of his consciousness for many years (Pendergrast, 1995, P. 103).” This is in stark contrast to everything else ever written about the case; Fitzpatrick provided many descriptions of his memory, but never claimed he remembered it all along.
The book Piper cited in support of this claim is a secondary source – it does not contain the speech itself. Surprisingly, Pendergrast’s book has no citation for the sentences that contain this quote. The following sentence in the book cites a personal interview with Dr. Stuart Grassian, who stated in personal communication that he did not attribute any words to Fitzpatrick in his interview with Pendergrast. Secondly, Fitzpatrick attests that he declined to participate in any of Dr. Grassian’s studies of Porter’s survivors. Piper also misquoted and miscited Pendergrast, removing original quotation marks without informing the reader. In conclusion, this citation and following claim are unsubstantiated.
Amongst these dramatic mischaracterizations, Piper contradicted himself about the impact of the archive and incorrectly defined “corroboration.” He implied that “sexual contact between children and adults” could be “neutral or positive,” and that children’s negative reactions to CSA are “adversely conditioned” by society as they experience “no significant harm.”
You can read Ross Cheit’s detailed response to Piper’s critique in “Junk Skepticism and Recovered Memory: A Reply to Piper” which upholds the burden of proof.
Murray Huber, Jr. was charged with 16 counts of sexual abuse and incest. The complainant, known as A.H., disclosed to a boyfriend over time, in bits and pieces, before going to the police.  Huber initially made an effort to dismiss A.H’s testimony on the basis of recovered memory. However, rather than proceeding to trial and challenging her memory, Mr. Huber pleaded guilty two months later. He was sentenced to one year in prison with 20 years suspended.
Dr. Harrison Pope, a FMSF advisory board member, served as the expert witness for the defense for Huber’s motion to dismiss A.H.’s testimony. He never actually examined A.H., but nevertheless concluded “to a reasonable medical certainty” that she had unreliable recovered memories. Pope reached this conclusion despite the fact that A.H.’s medical records included a notation from her primary physician that A.H. “has always known [about the abuse] and this was not a realization late in life.” The motion was dismissed and A.H. was allowed to testify. 
Harrison Pope misconstrued A.H.'s memories as unreliable recovered memories in an attempt to dismiss her testimony, despite the fact that her memories were continuous.
Read more in this Blog Post and the court decision
DMM v. Pilo
D.M.M, a Canadian Actress, accused Dr. Leo Pilo of repeated sexual abuse from age 9 to 19, filing a complaint with the Ontario College of Physicians and Surgeons. Four unrelated women came forward with similar accusations of sexual abuse. After initially denying the accusation, Pilo admitted to the sexual abuse of all five women, including specific sexual acts in the allegations. His medical license was permanently revoked. 
D.M.M later sued Pilo in civil court for damages. However, Pilo claimed to be innocent – despite his earlier public confession. Regardless, D.M.M won the case, and Pilo was forced to pay her $300,000 in damages. 
Harold Merskey, a FMSF scientific and advisory board member, served as the expert witness for Pilo’s defense. Without even examining D.M.M, Merskey claimed that she “very likely” suffers from False Memory Syndrome. Furthermore, a letter written by Merskey in defense of Pilo was circulated over the internet, in part due to the efforts of a contact person for the FMSF in Canada:
"The doctor was advised by his lawyers that with so many women joining to accuse him he had no chance of escaping a conviction, and the doctor--still protesting his innocence--agreed after consulting another lawyer to make a plea bargain so that he would receive no penalty other than suspension from practice, when his practice was in any case winding down."
You can read the "Summary of Cases" of the Discipline Committee's handling of the complaints against Dr. Pilo. Note (1) that Dr. Pilo's license was revoked (not relinquished), and (2) that the Board went out of its way to express moral outrage at the doctor's behavior, stating that “His abhorrent behavior has been repugnant in the extreme and the only conceivable penalty is revocation… He should never again have the privilege of seeing a patient.” 
See also the full text of the Complaints and the Findings of Fact. Pay particular attention to the Findings of Fact, wherein Dr. Pilo admitted the facts that Merskey denied.
Elizabeth Loftus served as an expert witness for the defense in Sheldon v. Hatlen.
During a presentation at the FMSF’s official conference in 2000, Loftus said: “I’ll tell you another horrifying thing: I just testified in a case in Alaska, it was a case brought by a woman against her grandfather. The jury awarded 800,000$. I’d bet my house no abuse happened in that case by that grandfather.”  Loftus describes the case by stating that “they sued two grandfathers,” and that “one of them was terrified about this all and settled out for a nominal sum… Got construed as a kind of, a confession, and a settlement and an admission of guilt in a lawsuit, and it added credibility to her claim against the other grandfather.” Loftus used the case as an example of the FMSF’s opposition becoming smarter and ‘sharpening their swords.’ 
However, the case had little to do with recovered memory and was heavily corroborated. One of the two perpetrators named, Sheldon’s grandfather, admitted to abusing Sheldon and raping Sheldon’s mother before legal proceedings were initiated, which was supported by the testimony of Sheldon’s sister Jasmine. He settled out of court after confessing to the abuse.
Sheldon also had years of journal entries documenting the abuse by the second perpetrator, her step-grandfather, written within days of each assault. She wrote extensively about trying and failing to forget the abuse. She told her childhood friend Tara Howard about the abuse within weeks after an assault in Canada, and Tara’s testimony correlated with the journal entries. With these facts in mind, there is little evidence that her memories could have been contaminated by suggestion in the short time between assaults and recording them in her diary.
If there were any possibility that Sheldon did forget the abuse for a period of time, she remembered it during the final sexual assault when she was 19. She always remembered the final sexual assault, and continued to remember the previous abuse.
Finally, Leif Hatlen’s testimony was inconsistent. He refused to disclose any files associated with his therapy. His wife, Elsie, volunteered at the police station that received the charges of abuse against Hatlen. Upon hearing that charges were filed through her connection to the station, the two of them sold their house and moved within a month. 
Read the full analysis of the case, including a timeline, cast of characters, and excerpts from testimonies.
Gina goes into therapy - there’s other people involved
Two other girls - his goddaughter, police report
Under legal cases
Yes, corroborated on RM, but other things say he’s clearly guilty
Hold, and learn more
Overturned on admissibility of evidence, and violation of his right against self-incrimination.
Recovered memory testimony - introduced evidence that the daughter had been hypnotized
Right against self-incrimination had been violated
Elieen franklin (daughter) visits him in jail, and says “dad, I just have to know: did you kill my friend” “points to sign”
History of predation
Overturned doesn’t necessarily mean he’s not guilty.
Peter Freyd: Omitted Paragraphs
Peter Freyd was a founder of the FMSF and husband of the foundation’s Executive Director, Pamela Freyd. He managed multiple email listservs serving members of the FMSF. In multiple incidents on the FMSF-news listserv, Peter Freyd distributed news articles about recovered memory cases, celebrating wins for the FMSF. However, he omitted multiple paragraphs from the news articles that contained contradictory evidence or opposed FMSF views.
1. Diana Elliot
In an email titled “Victory in Rhode Island,” Peter Freyd distributed the text of a Providence Journal-Bulletin article on recovered memory with two missing paragraphs.
 FMSF Staff. (1995, June 1). Rumors and Our Critics. FMS Foundation Newsletter. 4(6), 4.
 Fields, R. (1992, July 25). Witness Says She Felt Confusion and Guilt; Memory of Sex Abuse Comes Back by Observing Daughter, Court is Told. Akron Beacon Journal.
 Herald v. Hood (Summit County, Ohio, jury verdict, 1992; affirmed 1995). Testimony of Julie Herald pp. 771-781.
 Herald v. Hood (Summit County, Ohio, jury verdict, 1992; affirmed 1995). Testimony of Dr. Devies, pp. 152 - 191.
 Herald v. Hood (Summit County, Ohio, jury verdict, 1992; affirmed 1995). Testimony of Ms. Didato, pp. 454-9.
 FMSF Staff (1995, April 3). Supreme Court Rejects Ohio Man's Appeal In Repressed-Memories Case. FMS Foundation Newsletter. 4(4), 7.
 Herald v. Hood (Summit County, Ohio, jury verdict, 1992; affirmed 1995). Testimony of Dennis Hood. pp. 725 - 734.
 FMSF Staff (2005, July/August). Criminal Conviction in Florida Based on Recovered Memories. FMS Foundation Newsletter. 14(4), 9-10.
 State of Florida v. Billy Earl Banks Sr.. (2005, April 27). Testimony of DGH. Case No. 03-1144-CFA. (Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Martin County, Florida). pg. 406
 State of Florida v. Billy Earl Banks Sr.. (2005, April 27). Testimony of MAB. Case No. 03-1144-CFA. (Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Martin County, Florida). pg. 240
 Billy Banks v. State of Florida. (2006, March 23). Fourth District Court of Appeal, Florida. Case 4D05-4197
 FMSF Staff. (2011, Fall). And On It Goes: A Challenge from Ross Cheit. FMS Foundation Newsletter. 20(4), 7.
 Franklin v. Stevenson (1999, June 18). Supreme Court of Utah. No. 970016
 Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss: Recovered Memory, State v. Huber. Docket No. 218-2016-CR-189,238. Rockingham County Superior Court, New Hampshire.
 The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario and Dr. Leo Pilo. (1994, November). Summary of Cases. Member’s Dialogue: Discipline Committee Decisions.
 Butler, Katy (1996, November/December). The Latest on Recovered Memory. Psychotherapy Networker. http://www.katybutler.com/publications/psychnetorg/index_files/psychthernet_recovermemory.htm
 Loftus, Elizabeth. (April 2000). Paving the Road to Reason with Science. [Conference Presentation]. False Memory Syndrome: New Perspectives. White Plains, New York.
 Tamia Sheldon v. Leif Hatlen (1999). Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District at Anchorage. Case No. 3AN-98-5153 Civil